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INTRODUCTION
1
The purpose of this investigation will be to determine
whether children of high Intelligence are superior to chil-
dren of average intelligence on a concept attainment task
with different levels of stimulus complexity. Another goal
Is to determine what effects verbalization and the frequency
of different negative Instances will have on the concept
attainment performance of high and average Intelligence
children
.
Theories of Concept Attainment
Bourne (1966) notes that theories of concept attain-
ment can be divided Into two groups, the associationlstic
,
and the hypothesis testing. The assumptions of these two
groups of theories will be discussed below as they relate
to the problem under consideration In this study.
The associationlstic theories of concept attainment
assume that the subject In a concept attainment situation
Is a passive participant In the process. According to
these theories the subject learns the concept through the
building up of the positively reinforced Instances, and
the dropping out of the non-relnforced instances. Concept
attainment Is viewed as a more complex form of discrlmlna-
2tlon learning. The subject learns to discriminate between
the relevant and Irrelevant aspects of the stimuli on the
basis of reinforcement or non-reinforcement of a response.
Gradually the connection Is established between a particu-
lar stimulus and response (based on reinforcement), and
the problem Is solved.
The hypothesis testing theories make several different
assumptions. These theories view the subject as an active
participant in the concept attainment process. The subject
at all times has a hypothesis (or strategy) which he is
constantly testing out In order to arrive at a solution.
The subject modifies his current hypothesis on the basis
of the Incoming Information which either confirms or In-
firms his current hypothesis. Based upon such information
the subject continuously modifies his hypothesis until he
arrives at the correct hypothesis, and solves the problem.
The subject who uses hypothesis testing to attain a
concept selects the aspects he considers relevant, tests
the adequacy of his hypothesis, and then alters his hypoth-
esis until It fits the data. While some associations de-
velop In this process, they are viewed as the
by-product
of the testing procedure. The actual attainment
of the
concept may involve the recognition and understanding
of
3the principle which Is required by the given problem.
Riley (1968) In his recent comprehensive and cogent
review of the literature concerning discrimination learn-
ing raises some theoretical and empirical Issues which have
relevance to the present discussion of concept attainment.
He notes that If the subject In a discrimination learning
situation Is following what has been referred to as an
association! Stic method of solution, the learning curve
for that subject could be described as continuous. How-
ever, If the subject Is following the hypothesis testing
method, his learning curve would be of a discountlnuous
nature.
If the assocl a tl onl stl c method Is followed, then the
subject, according to this theory, will associate all the
stimuli striking receptors at the time a response is made
If this event Is followed by a satisfying state of affairs
( reinforcement )
.
On the other hand, a subject using the hypothesis
testing approach will associate only some of the stimuli
striking the receptors, those that he is attending to.
Riley also raises a third alternative, that the subject
can switch the selectivity of response from one aspect of
the stimulus to another.
4Riley cites empirical support for each of these theo-
retical points of view cited above. While much of the re-
search has been done with animals (e.g., rats) as subjects.
It appears to have relevance to the process of concept
attainment. The Intent here however Is not to become In-
volved In a rather complex debate over the various posi-
tions, but rather to note that there may be different
processes by which a subject may attain a concept. The
more precise relation of these points of view to the con-
cept attainment behavior of high and average Intelligence
subjects will be discussed In a following section.
Intelligence and Co n cept Attainment
While many investigators and theorists acknowledge the
relevance and Importance of Intelligence in the process of
concept attainment, the literature does not abound with
studies of this nature. In his recent review, Bourne (1966)
provides a thorough report on concept attainment research
and theory. In summing up his findings. Bourne notes that,
"Much remains to be learned about the relationship between
Intelligence and conceptual behavior (p. 92)." Van de Seer
and Jaspers (1966) concur with Bourne's suggestion, indica-
ting that more research Is needed In dealing with the
highly related variables of cognition and intelligence.
5Several significant and wel 1
-control 1 ed research
studies In the area of concept attainment and Intelligence
have been conducted by Osier and her associates (Osier and
Five!, 1961; Osier and Trautman, 1961; and Osier and Weiss,
1962) and Yudin (1966). An attempt will be undertaken here
to discuss the results they have obtained, and how they
serve to direct new research toward firmer and more valid
conclusions about the relationship between Intelligence and
concept attainment.
In the first study. Osier and her associates (Osier
and Five!, 1961) investigated the relationship between In-
telligence and age on a concept attainment task. Six, ten,
and fourteen year old children were required to attain a
concept of either bird, animal, or living thing, typifying
what Osier called naturalistic stimuli. Subjects were re-
inforced with marbles (which they later exchanged for a
toy) until they reached a criterion of ten consecutive
correct responses or 150 trials, whichever occurred first.
With number of errors to criterion as the measure of per-
formance, the high Intelligence subjects performed signifi-
cantly better than the average Intelligence subjects. Her
results also showed better performance with Increasing
age.
6Osier Justified her use of naturalistic stimuli by
noting that the older and more Intelligent subjects, be-
cause of their familiarity with verbal symbols, might be
favored by more formal types of stimuli. Possibly the
ability to manipulate and make use of verbal symbols Is an
Important determinant of effective concept attainment, and
her selection of naturalistic stimulus materials may have
reduced the obtained superiority of concept attainment
per
formance of the older and more Intelligent subjects.
In order to Investigate further the specific
mechanism
by which higher Intelligence subjects manifested
their
superior performance. Osier divided her subjects
into
gradual and sudden learners. She assumed
that gradual
learners build up S-R associations, a
process probably
associated with lower Intelligence, and
that sudden learners
test successive hypotheses, a mediating
process probably
related to higher Intelligence. She
found that the number
of sudden learners In the high
Intelligence group was sig-
nificantly greater than In the average
Intelligence group.
Osier claims that these results
support the notion that the
relationship between Intelligence
and concept attainment Is
7a function of the high frequency of hypotheses testing In
the high intelligence subjects.
The second study In this series (Osier and Trautman,
1961) was concerned with examining the level of stimulus
complexity and how It affected the concept attainment per-
formance of average and high Intelligence children. Osier
reasoned that if hypothesis testing Is more frequent among
subjects of higher Intelligence* It should be possible to
Impair the performance of the superior group by Increasing
the number of irrelevant dimensions upon which hypotheses
can be based. On the other hand, the performance of sub-
jects of average Intelligence, who are supposed to achieve
solution by the gradual build up of S-R associations, should
f .
not be Influenced by the large number of Irrelevant stimulus
dimensions
.
Osier varied stimulus complexity through the use of
two different sets of stimuli. The simple set (formal two)
consisted of black circles which varied In both pattern and
*
number, while her complex set (object two) war. a series cf
pictures of common objects. The common object set was
assumed to be more complex because of the greater number of
Irrelevant stimulus attributes present. Osier's results
showed that the high Intelligence children were able to
8perform in a superior manner only on the simple set. Their
performance on the complex set was approximately equivalent
to the performance of the average Intelligence subjects.
Wolff (1967a) noted some relevant criticisms, and then
subjected Osier and Trautman's (1961) study to replication.
Wolff criticized the reasoning employed by Osier and Traut-
man on the following grounds: he noted that hypothesis
mediated learning Is more frequent among older than younger
children, and therefore that stimulus complexity should
differentially affect subjects of different ages (l.e.,
there should be an Interaction between age and stimulus
complexity with the older children performing better with
more complex stimuli). No effect of this sort was found In
Osier and Trautman's data.
The data Wolff (1967a) obtained by replicating Osier
and Trautman's (1961) study did not support Osier and Traut-
man's data. Wolff found significant main effects for both
intelligence (high Intelligence subjects performed better)
and complexity (the more complex stimuli reduced concept
attainment performance). In addition, Wolff c l a ims that
while his obtained Interaction between these two
variables
was not significant, it tended to be in the
opposite
9direction of Osier and Trautman‘$.
However, a careful examination of Wolff's data shows
that some of his claims were not entirely justified. Since
Wolff used only 11 year old children and Osier and Trautman
used 6, 10, and 14 year olds In order to make a more valid
comparison between the two studies, one must examine only
Osier and Trautman's data for their ten year olds. This
examination reveals that Wolff's subjects on the simple
stimulus materials performed approximately twice as well as
Osier and Trautman's subjects. On the complex stimuli
Wolff's data show that the performance of his high Intelli-
gence group was significantly better than Osier and Traut-
man's subjects, while the average Intelligence subjects in
both studies performed about the same.
What caused Wolff's simple stimuli to Induce such Im-
proved performance? One may speculate that it could have
been due to one of the following: (1) the intelligence test
used to select subjects {Wolff used the Henmon-Nel son , Osier
and Trautman, the WISC); (2) the use of different Instruc-
tions which Wolff did not publish; or (3) the stimulus
materials in the two studies were slightly different
(Wolff's circles were h" In diameter. Osier and Trautman's
V in diameter, and Wolff's card area was twice as large).
However, none of these explanations can be firmly estab-
lished, so that we must take Wolff's aberrant data on the
simple set Into consideration In any discussion of his
results.
Wolff chose to Ignore the difference between his and
Osier and Trautman's results on the simple stimuli and
concentrated his discussion on the obtained differences with
the complex stimuli. Wolff's explanation comes from
Podell's (1958) study which found that a large variety of
positive stimuli aids hypothesis testing learning (i.e.,
high Intelligence subjects) while It hinders associative
learning (I.e., average Intelligence subjects).
Wolff also found that Osier and Trautman had used un-
equal numbers of "one instance" negative instances in their
sets of stimuli { 25 % In the simple set, but 75 % in the com-
plex set), whereas he had used equal proportions { 25 %) of
the negative instances in both the simple and complex sets.
Wolff reasoned that any Increase in the variety of positive
or negative stimuli aids the hypothesis tester, i.e.,
the
high Intelligence subjects, and hinders the performance of
the average intelligence subjects, and thus provided an
explanation for his results with the complex
stimuli.
Wolff's data also suggests an alternative
hypothesis
11
regarding the effect of the variety of negative Instances.
For subjects who achieve concept attainment via S-R asso-
ciations, the 75% one Instance condition would allow for
more efficient solution because the dl sproportlonal 1 ty of
negative Instances would allow the average Intelligence
subjects to eliminate one possible alternative quickly and
then concentrate on the others. This mode of solution
would also hold true for the high Intelligence subjects
with the 75% one Instance condition.
However, when equal numbers of negative Instances
exist, the solution via S-R associations becomes less effi-
cient because there is no quick method to eliminate even
one negative Instance. Solution for the average Intelli-
gence subjects Is then necessarily less efficient than
under the 75% one Instance condition. High intelligence
subjects, on the other hand, because they achieve solution
by the testing of successive hypotheses could solve the
problem more efficiently since they are not dependent upon
the reinforcement contingencies operating at the time.
One could also ask why high intelligence children are
hindered by hypothesis testing only with the object two set
and not possibly by a formal two set of greater
stimulus
complexity. Osier claims that the use of a formal
two set
12
with Increased stimulus dimensions would assist the high In-
telligence subjects more than the average Intelligence sub-
jects because of the former's greater familiarity with
verbal labels. This Increase In complexity, whether It Is
a more complex formal two set or the object two set, should
according to Osier's reasoning provide more opportunities
for hypothesis testing, and therefore hinder the high In-
telligence subjects.
What Osier seems to Imply, but never states. Is one of
the following arguments: (1) The object two set, because
of Its greater number of irrelevant stimuli which have to
be tested (by hypotheses for the high intelligence subjects),
overloads the capacity of the high Intelligence subjects in
such a way that they can no longer maintain their
superior-
ity over the average intelligence subjects; (2) since the
object two stimuli are more familiar to all children, the
verbal labels for these stimuli are equally
available to
both high and average Intelligence children.
Familiarity
with verbal labels aids In more efficient
concept attain-
ment, and therefore the average
Intelligence subjects are
able to perform at the same level as
the high Intelligence
subjects
.
Yudin (1966) found significant
differences in favor of
13
high over average and low Intelligence subjects, and average
over low Intelligence subjects. The subjects used In
Yudin's study were adolescents, and he did not address
himself to a study of the specific learning mechanism that
was associated with Intelligence. He did however note that
the ability to acquire and transform information from current
and previous conceptual instances was related to better per-
formance .
In a study reported by Kates and Weiner (1967) there
was an attempt to Investigate whether the conceptual superi-
ority of high Intelligence children (ages 10, 12, and 14)
was due to the use of a whollst rule. It was discovered
that teaching this rule benefited superior as well as
bright, normal, and average Intelligence children. The
conclusion appears to be that the use of a whollst rule for
mediating conceptual Information was not the basis for the
conceptual superiority of the superior intelligence children.
Stimulus Complexi ty and Concept AttaJnjnjent
While the previous section dealt with studied concerned
with both stimulus complexity and Intelligence, It
appears
to be worthwhile to note briefly some of the
research deal-
ing with stimulus complexity and concept
attainment.
14
The vast majority of the research In the area of
stimulus complexity and concept attainment (or Identifi-
cation) has been directed primarily at mathematical learn-
ing theory. While the present review does not necessitate
a presentation of the Intricacies of the models Involved,
It Is worthwhile to review briefly some of the more promi-
nent studies Involving stimulus complexity.
Bourne and Restle (1959) proposed a model which states
that the difficulty of concept attainment is directly re-
lated to the number of Irrelevant cues, and Inversely re-
lated to the number of redundant relevant cues. According
to their model the relevant stimuli become conditioned
(learned), while the Irrelevant cues adapt out (they become
suppressed). The probability of a correct response Is thus
a joint function of the state of both conditioning and
adaptation processes.
Much of the subsequent research in this area has been
directed at a test of the model proposed by Bourne and
Restle. The majority of these studies have shown that the
greater the complexity of the stimuli, the more difficult
the attainment of the concept, thus supporting the Bourne
and Restle model
,
Bourne (1957) used a concept identification task with
one
,
three, and five bits of Irrelevant Information.
He
15
found that there was an Increase In mean solution time,
mean number of errors, and mean number of trials with In-
creasing amounts of Irrelevant Information. Brown and
Archer (1956) and Archer, Bourne, and Brown (1955) all
obtained results similar to those of Bourne (1957) using
problems with varying amounts of Irrelevant dimensions.
Bourne and Haygood (1959, 1961) found that as the number of
relevant dimensions Increased the mean number of errors de-
creased. In addition, they found the previous effect of
Irrelevant information to hold.
Despite the vast number of concept Identification
studies concerned with the effect of complexity, either
relevant or Irrelevant information, none have sought to
partial out the effects of Intelligence. On the basis of
the research reported In the previous section (Osier and
Trautman, 1961; and Wolff, 1967a), one would expect a
differential effect of complexity and Intelligence upon
concept Identification.
Denny (1966) feels that the task complexity specifies
the stimulus demands placed upon the organism,
while in-
telligence refers to the organism’s capacity to
learn use-
ful habits for responding to the stimuli
of the task. He
goes on to speculate that, "...a lower
level of task com-
16
plexity and higher intelligence will favor the development
of correct habits and vice versa (p. 600)." While the
above inferences were made by Denny, he did not test them
In any empirical manner.
Verbalization and Concept Attainment Performanc e
For Lurla (1957) speech plays an Important part In
children's thought processes. It is through the use of
speech that the child orients himself to his environment,
organizes his past experiences, and helps to regulate his
actions. Language acts as a mediator of connections, and
Is a crucial aspect of normal development. He states,
"The normal child of 5*5 years and upwards forms new connec-
tions In these conditions largely by using a verbal system,
which enables him to abstract and generalize the signifi-
cant elements In the signals and to find his bearing among
them (p. 119).“
Liubllnskaya (1957) feels that the learning of con-
cepts Is facilitated and conceptual transfer Is extended
through the use of verbal labels. In addition, he states
that giving a verbal label to a relevant dimension
is more
effective In terms of future performance than
training on
that dimension.
17
Clearly then, verbalization and the ready availability
of verbal labels are critical In efficient concept attain-
ment. Osier and Trautman (1961) cited better verbal abili-
ties as one possibility for the anticipated superior per-
formance of the high Intelligence subjects on a more com-
plex formal two task.
Weir and Stevenson (1959) used a discrimination learn-
ing task to test the hypothesis that verbalization would
improve subsequent learning performance. They found that
their experimental group which had learned to verbalize the
names of the stimuli (pictures of animals) before making
their response had significantly more correct answers when
compared to the group which did not verbalize the response.
This significant difference was noted In all the continuous
age groups studied, from three to nine years. Their expla-
nation was that verbalization requires the subject to
orient to the relevant stimulus, and thus enhances the
like
llhood of his sampling the correct cues and making
the
correct hypothesis.
Kendler and Kendler (1959) posited a verbal
mediating
response as central to concept attainment.
S-R theory
predicts that a reversal (Intradlmenslonal )
shift wool; be
more difficult than a nonreversal
(Interdlmensional ) 5hlft '
18
Kendler and Kendler (1959) found that the reversal shift
was easier for older than for younger children. Their ex-
planation was that older children were better able to make
use of a verbal (covert) mediating response than were the
younger children. All their subjects were subsequently
divided Into two groups, a group of slow learners and a
group of fast learners, similar to the division Osier and
Five! (1961) made. Kendler and Kendler's (1959) results
showed that the fast learners group made the reversal shift
on significantly fewer trials than did the group of slow
learners. Thus, If we Integrate these results with those
of Osier and Flvel (1961), who found a significantly greater
number of high intelligence children in their group of fast
learners, we could hypothesize that the higher Intelligence
children were more successful because they could make use
of a verbal mediating response.
Kendler (1964) found that children who had been In-
structed to verbally represent the cues In a di scrlml na ^ t o*.
problem had significantly fewer trials to criterion when
they made an optional reversal shift than those subjects
who were not required to verbalize. Kendler notes, "Rela-
tively mature humans are likely to respond to a discrimina-
tion learning or concept formation situation by making
19
covert responses which mediate both learning and transfer
(1964, p. 435).” Although Kendler obtained IQ scores for
all subjects In this study, she did not report any results
with regard to these scores. The reader Is left to suppose
that the IQ scores were used for control purposes.
Elfermann (1965) required subjects In a concept attain-
ment task to give a reason for their choice after each guess
they made. The subject was then Informed whether or not
his choice was correct. Her results showed that subjects
who could not justify correctly their choices had more In-
efficient solutions to the problems than did the subjects
who were able to correctly justify their choices.
In a recent paper, Wolff (1967b) found that overt ver-
balization facilitated the concept attainment performance
of children In an Osier-type task. Wolff hypothesizes
"... In the overt verbalization condition a number of Ss
are forced to label the stimuli who would not have done
so
otherwise (p. 25).”
The relevant points of the literature reviewed
above
are as follows. High Intelligence children have
signifi-
cantly better concept attainment performance
and are pre-
sumed to use hypothesis testing In order to
solve the
problems presented to them. The possible
explanation for
20
their superior performance Is that they have available, and
\
make use of, verbal symbols or cues which enable them to
solve the problem more efficiently. Implicit In this
reasoning Is that through the use of verbal labels the hy-
potheses are more easily and efficiently generated and
tested, thus leading to superior concept attainment perfor-
mance .
Children of average Intelligence, on the other hand,
apparently do not have the verbal labels as readily avail-
able, and consequently their mode of concept attainment Is
assumed to be made on the basis of S-R associations and
the reinforcement contingencies operating at the time.
However, when Irrelevant stimuli (through the use cf
more complex stimuli) are added to the concept attainment
task, the result Is a decrement in the performance of the
high Intelligence subjects, possibly due to the fact that
there are more hypotheses to be tested. Thus, through the
Introduction of more complex stimuli, the concept attain-
ment performance of high and average Intelligence subjects
becomes essentially equal.
The effect of verbalization of responses during concept
attainment is to increase the performance efficiency be-
cause verbal cues are brought into and kept In awareness.
21
If this Is the case, and It appears to be so (Wolff,
1967b), the performance of average Intelligence subjects
who verbalize their responses during a concept attainment
task should Improve when compared to average Intelligence
subjects who do not verbalize. That Is, the verbalization
of a response should Induce greater hypothesis testing be-
havior on the part of average Intelligence children who
apparently do not engage In this mode of solution normally.
Furthermore, when these average Intelligence subjects
verbalize their responses, their performance should Im-
prove on a task composed of equal numbers of negative In-
stances, where previously hypotheses testing has proven to
be the more efficient mode of solution.
Problem
The problem this study seeks to Investigate Is whether
high Intelligence subjects are more efficient in their con-
cept attainment performance than average Intelligence sub-
jects. In addition, the differential effects of both
stimulus complexity and verbalization upon the concept
attainment performance of subjects of both high and average
Intelligence will be explored. This study will also
examine the effects of the frequency of different negative
Instances and how It affects the concept attainment
per-
22
formance of high and average Intelligence subjects.
Hypotheses
Specifically, the hypotheses are as follows:
1. High Intelligence subjects will have significantly
fewer errors than the average Intelligence subjects.
2. The simple stimulus set will give significantly
fewer errors than the complex stimulus set, which In turn
will be fewer than the object two set.
3. The verbalization group will have significantly
fewer errors than the control group.
4. There will be a significant Interaction between
Intelligence and complexity. The high Intelligence sub-
*
**.'
jects will have fewer errors than the average Intelligence
subjects on the simple and complex stimulus sets and
approximately the same on the object two set.
5. There will be a significant Interaction between
intelligence and the frequency of different negative In-
stances. The average Intelligence subjects will have more
errors than the high Intelligence subjects when there Is
an equal frequency of each negative Instance (Set 2), whil
the performance of the high and average Intelligence sub-
jects will be approximately equal when there Is a dispro-
portionate frequency of each negative Instance (Set 1).
METHOD
23
Subjects
The subjects were 96 second grade boys and girls from
the Worcester, Massachusetts public schools. They were
classified as high or average Intelligence subjects on the
following basis. Prior to the administration of the ex-
perimental task, the school group Intelligence scores
(Otl s-Lennon) were obtained by an Individual other than
the experimenter. Then this individual randomly assigned
the subjects to the experimental conditions based on this
group intelligence test. The high group had a range of
115 - 125
,
the average group had a range of 95-105. Follow-
ing the experimental task each subject was administered two
subtests from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(WISC), vocabulary and block design, which correlate .874
with the full scale score (Simpson and Bridges, 1959). If
the two Intelligence measures were not within five points
of each other the subject was not Included In the data
analyses. In addition, no subject was included who had
failed any grade In school.
The high Intelligence group had a mean 10 of 119.02
(SD * 3 . 18 ), while the average Intelligence group had a
24
mean of 100,87 (SD * 3 . 11 ). In addition, the subjects were
matched for age and socio-economic status using the Holllng-
shead Index of Social Position. Appendix 1 contains the
means and standard deviations for these two measures.
Appa ratus
A self-supporting wooden frame 18" by 22" contained the
stimulus cards. Each stimulus card contained both positive
and negative Instances, which were separated by a solid
black line down the center of the card. Below each Instance
there was a button which the subjects used to signal their
responses. Each of the two buttons controlled one of the
two lights visible only to the experimenter which allowed
him to record the responses. The marbles were dispensed
down a chute on the right hand side of the frame as the sub-
ject faced It. The experimenter changed each of the stimu-
lus cards, dispensed the marbles, and recorded the subjects'
responses
.
Stlmul
1
The concept attainment stimuli used were modeled
after
those used by Osier and Trautman (1961) and Wolff
(1967a).
The simple set (formal two) consisted of solid
black
circles h" In diameter. In random patterns,
placed upon
half of a 5" by 8" white index card. The
positive in-
25
stances consisted of only two black circles, while the nega-
tive instances had either 1, 3, 4, or 5 black circles. The
negative and positive Instances were presented simultane-
ously, one Instance on each half of the 5" by 8" Index card.
The second set of stimulus cards was similar to the
object two set of Osier and Trautman (1961). The positive
stimuli for this set consisted of two identical pictures of
common objects (e.g., airplanes, dogs), pasted upon half of
a 5
M by 8" white Index card. Identical to those of the
simple set. The negative stimuli for this set consisted of
the same type of pictures In numbers of 1, 3, 4, or 5. The
pictures were matched for general area, brightness, and
color combinations.
In addition to the object two set used by Osier and
Trautman (1961), a complex set was used which had better
control of the Irrelevant stimulus dimensions than Osier
and Trautman's object two set. The complex set was pre-
sented In the same manner as the simple and object two sets,
but consisted of different shapes, circles, squares, o
r
triangles, and of different colors, red, green, or black.
All stimulus sets, the simple, the object two, and the
complex contained 100 cards (200 Instances), and for all
sets the correct concept was the concept of two-ness.
The
26
negative and positive Instances appeared equally often on
each side of the card and were randomized over trial blocks
of 12 Instances so as to avoid any sequence effects. In
addition, the presentation order was randomized.
Each of the three stimulus sets described above had
two different forms which varied systematically the relative
frequency of the types of different negative stimuli. In
Set 1, 76 trials had ’one Instance' as the negative In-
stance, while 3, 4, and 5 Instances appeared on 8 trials
each. Set 2 had all negative instances appearing on an
equal number of trials, 25.
Procedure
Each subject was tested Individually. The subjects
were told that they were going to play a “game." Once In
the experimental room they were shown several small toys
and were asked to select one that they would like to have
as a prize. The selected toy was put aside, and then the
subject was seated In front of the apparatus, and given one
of the following experimental instructions:
Control Conditi on
Listen carefully and I will tell you how to win
(name of selected toy). Watch these pictures.
You see there Is a button under each one of them.
Pick one of the pictures and push the button under
it like this (E demonstrated). Now you push the
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button. If you get a marble, leave It In the tray.
Now watch the pictures and push the button
and see If you can win many marbles. When you
fill your tray with marbles, you can have the (name
of toy). If you watch the pictures carefully, you
can learn how the machine gives marbles.
Verbaliza tion Con dition
Listen carefully and I will tell you how to win
the (name of selected toy). Watch these pictures.
You see there Is a button under each one of them.
Pick one of the pictures and push the button under
It like this (E demonstrated). After you push
the button, teTl me what Is In the picture above
the button you pushed. Now push the button. If
you get a marble, leave It In the tray.
Now watch the pictures and push the button
and tell me what is In the picture, and see If
you can win many marbles. When you fill your tray
with marbles, you can have the (name of toy).
If you watch the pictures carefully, you can
learn how the machine gives marbles.
Any subject who, after inquiry. Indicated that he did
not understand the Instructions was not Included In the
study. Each subject was tested until he reached a criterion
of ten consecutive correct trials or failed to solve the
problem within the 100 trial maximum. Following the experi-
mental task the subjects were administered the short form
of the WISC.
After completion of the experimental task each subject
was asked, "How did you know how to get a marble every
time?" In addition, following the experiment each
subject
was warned not to discuss the "game" with his friends
or
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cl assmates.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable used to determine concept attain-
ment efficiency was the number of errors made during the
concept attainment task.
Each subject was also classified as a gradual or a
sudden learner based on his performance over the ten trials
preceeding the ten criterion trials. Gradual learners were
those subjects whose percentage of correct trials was greater
than the median (50%), and the sudden learners were those
subjects whose percentage of correct trials fell below the
median
.
Experimental Design
A2x3x2x2 factorial design was used. The fac-
torial combination of intelligence level (high, average),
stimulus complexity (simple, complex, object two), verbali-
zation (verbalization, control), and frequency of different
negative instances (Set 1, Set 2) yielded 24 experimental
groups of 4 subjects each (2 males, 2 females), and a totai
of 96 subjects (see Table 1),
Chi Square Analyses were used to compare the perrorm-
ance of the gradual vs. sudden learners, for comparing the
performance of the subjects who could correctly verbalize
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Table 1
Experimental Design
Intel 11 qence Comp! exl ty Freq. of Negative
Instance
Verbalization
* Simple
Set 1
Set 2
Verbalization
Control
Verbal Izatlon
Control
High Complex
Set 1
Set 2
Verbal Izatlon
Control
Verbal Izatlon
Control
OT
Set 1
Set 2
Verbalization
Control
Verbal Izatlon
Control
Simple
Set 1
Set 2
Verbal Izatlon
Control
Verbal Izatlon
Control
Average Comp! ex
Set 1
Set 2
Verbal Izatlon
Control
Verbalization
Control
OT
Set 1
Set 2
Verbalization
Control
Verbal izatlon
Control
the answer to the task and those subjects who could not
verbalize the correct answer, and for comparing the high
and average Intelligence subjects on whether they verbal
Ized the correct answer following the task.
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/ RESULTS
The total number of errors was obtained for each sub-
ject, and then an analysis of variance was performed on
these scores. The results of this analysis are shown In
Table 2, while Tables 3 and 4 display the means and standard
deviations for all the groups.
The analysis of the data found a significant (P 4.. 005 )
effect for Intelligence. The high Intelligence subjects
made significantly fewer errors than the average Intelli-
gence subjects (see Table 3). This data supports Hypoth-
esis 1.
In addition, there was a significant ( p <. . 025 ) effect
for the frequency of different negative Instances. The
subjects who were exposed to the Set 1 (7695 one instance)
condition made fewer errors than did the subjects exposed
to the Set 2 (25% each negative Instance) condition (see
Table 3).
There were no significant effects due to verbalization,
complexity, the Interaction between Intelligence and com-
plexity, and the Interaction between Intelligence and the
frequency of different negative Instances (see Tables
2
and 3). Such data did not support Hypotheses 2, 3,
4, and 5
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Errors on
the Concept Attainment Task
Source df S
S
MS F £4
A (Intelligence) 1 4916.00 4916.00 11.35 .005
B (Complexity) 2 1786.43 893.21 2.06 ns
C (Verbalization) 1 565.51 565.51 1.30 ns
D (Frequency of
Different Nega-
tive Instances) 1 2915.01 2915.01 6,72 .025
AB 2 410.28 205.14 1 < ns
AC 1 111.17 111.17 1 4 ns
AD 1 90.85 90.85 1 4 ns
BC 2 986,99 493.49 1.14 ns
BD 2 120.02 60.01 1 4 ns
CD 1 158.00 158.00 1 4 ns
ABC 2 107.42 ' 53.71 14 ns
ABD 2 461.68 230.84 1 4 ns
ACD 1 8.49 8.49 1 4 ns
BCD 2 143.71 71.85 1 4 ns
ABCD 2 107.34 53.67 1 4 ns
Ss/ABCD 72 31211.00 433.49
Total 95 44099.90
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Main Effects
and Predicted Interactions for Number of Errors
on the Concept Attainment Task
Standard
Mean Deviation
High 21.27 18.46
Average 35.58 21.79
Simple 23.41 21.94
Compl ex 27.94 20.21
Object Two 33.94 20.75
Verbal Izatlon 26.00 22.59
Control 30.85 19.94
Set 1 22.92 20.01
Set 2 33.94 21.36
High
Simple 13.44 15.85
Compl ex 22.87 27.28
Object Two 27.50 18.87
Average
Simple 33.37 22.78
Complex 33.00 21.22
Object Two 40.37 18.61
Table 3 (cont'd)
Mean
Standard
Devi atlon
HM
Set 1 14.79 13.66
Set 2 27.75 20.13
Average
Set 1 31.04 21.85
Set 2 40.13 20.74
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of
Errors on the Concept Attainment Task
Standard
Mean Devi ation
High
Simple
Set 1
Verbal Izatlon 5.25 3.32
Control 13.50 15.33
Set 2
Verbal Izatlon 13.50 8.13
Control 21.50 23.69
Compl ex
Set 1
Verbal Izatlon 10.57 11.09
Control 23.00 10.44
Set 2
Verbal Izatlon 36.00 19.78
Control 21.75 4.79
Object Two
Set 1
Verbal Izatlon 19.50 15.43
Control 16.75 15.26
Table 4 (cont'd)
Mean
Standard
Devi at 1 oi
Set Two
Verbal Ization 36.50 17.56
Control 39.25 11.62
Average
Simple
Set 1
Verbal Ization 23.50 20.33
Control 26.75 14.16
Set 2 •
Verbalization 42.75 25.14
Control 40.50 23.47
Complex
Set 1
Verbal Ization 22.75 18.01
Control 39.50 20.70
Set 2
Verbal Ization 27.25 27.22
Control 42.50 8.96
Table 4 (cont'd)
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B
/
Standard
Mean Deviation
Verbal i zation 33.50 32.85
Control 40.25 10.69
Set 2
Verbal ization 42.75 4.93
Control 45.00 19.75
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The Chi Square analysis (Table 5) for the number of
gradual and sudden learners In the two Intelligence groups
reveals that there was not a significant difference In the
proportion of the number of gradual and sudden learners In
the high or average Intelligence groups.
Table 6 shows that there was a significant (p^.,001)
difference between the number of subjects who solved the
problem and those who did not solve the problem when they
were required to verbalize the answer to the concept attain-
ment problem.
Table 7 presents the analysis for the correct and in-
correct verballzers following the task In the high and
average Intelligence groups. This analysis shows that the
high Intelligence subjects were able to correctly verbalize
the answer to the task significantly ( p -c .05) more than the
average Intelligence subjects.
Due to the extreme heterogeneity of variance (Hartley's
test, Myers, 1966, f max » 63.39) a square root transforma-
tion was applied to the original data, and an analysis of
variance was performed on the transformed data. The results
of this analysis are shown In Table 8, and shovel no differ-
ences from the original analysis of variance.
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Table 5
Chi Square Analysis for the Number of Gradual vs. Sudden
Learners In the High and Average Intelligence Groups
High
Intel 1 1 gence
Average
Intel 1 1 gence
Sudden Gradual
Learners Learners
10
7
17
17
11
28
27
18
45
X 2 .035 (not significant)
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Table 6
Chi Square Analysis for Correct or Incorrect Verbalization
Following the Task for Solvers and Nonsolvers
Correct
Verbal 1 zat Ion
Solved Old Not
Task Solve Task
51 2 53
Incorrect
Verbalization 7 40 47
58 42 100
64.35 (P4-001)
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Table 7
Chi Square Analysis for High and Average Intelligence
Subjects and Ability to Correctly Verbalize the
Answer to the Problem Following the Task
Correct Incorrect
Verballzers Verballzers
High 31 17 48
Average 20 28 48
51 45 96
2 5.06 (p< .05)
Table 8
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Analysis of Variance for the Square Root Transformation
of the Number of Errors on the Concept Attainment Task
Source df SS MS F
A (Intelligence) 1 51.00 51.00 9.24 .005
B (Complexity) 2 24.77 12.39 2.24 ns
C (Verbalization) 1 7.94 7.94 1.44 ns
D (Frequency of
Different Nega-
tive Instances)
1 40.18 40.18 7.28 .01
AB 2 18.33 9.17 1.66 ns
AC 1 2.14 2.14 1 4. ns
AD 1 2.98 2.98 1 4. ns
BC 2 2.28 1.14 1 4 ns
BD 2 1.90 .95 1 4 ns
CD 1 6.18 6.18 1.12 ns
ABC 2 1,02 .51 1 4 ns
ABD 2 1.31 .65 1 4 ns
ACD 1 .97 .97 1 4 ns
BCD 2 1.42 .71 1 4 ns
ABCD 2 .41 .20 1 4. ns
Ss/ABCD 72 397.77 5.52
Total 95 560.60
DISCUSSION
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The obtained superiority of the high over the average
Intelligence subjects has several empirical and theoretical
Implications which warrant discussion.
It now appears that children of high Intelligence have
superior concept attainment performance when compared to
children of average Intelligence. Apparently they, the high
Intelligence subjects, had better ability when they were
required to deal with and solve the problem presented. If
conceptual abilities, such as memory, attention, and the
ability to transform Incoming Information are associated
with better concept attainment, then these skills apparently
contributed to the superior performance of the high Intelli-
gence subjects.
In an attempt to more carefully determine the relation-
ship between this Investigation and those of Wolff and
Osier, an analysis of variance was performed on the origi-
nal data, but omitting the data of the complex stimuli
(colored geometric shapes) and collapsing over the verbali-
zation variable which was not significant. The results of
this analysis are shown In Appendices 2 and 3.
This subsequent analysis found results which are
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consistent with the data obtained by Wolff (1967a) and In-
consistent with the data obtained by Osier and Trautman
(1961), There were significant effects due to Intelligence
and complexity, as well as for the frequency of different
negative Instances.
We must now ask the questions why did this Investiga-
tion obtain results similar to Wolff's (1967a), and why did
It fall to support Osier's studies? In her first study
(Osier and Five!, 1961) Osier found superior performance
for high Intelligence subjects using stimuli which had
characteristics similar to those she later called more
complex (object two) In a later study (Osier and Trautman,
1961). When she failed to obtain superior performance for
the high Intelligence subjects using stimuli which had
characteristics similar to those in the previous study.
Osier explained these discrepant results by asserting that
the Increased complexity Impaired the performance of the
high Intelligence group.
The current Investigation, however, shows that the use
of more complex stimuli did not overload (with extensive
hypothesis testing) the abilities of the high intelligence
subjects. It was found that the high Intelligence subjects
were able to perform In a superior manner to the subjects of
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average Intelligence even when the complexity of the
stimulus materials was Increased, If hypothesis testing Is
central to the concept attainment behavior of the high In-
telligence subject, as Osier believed, then Increased com-
plexity would lead to more hypothesis testing by the high
Intelligence subjects, and therefore Impair their per-
formance, Further, our findings with regard to the effect
of complexity on the performance of the high intelligence
subjects do not necessarily Invalidate the notion that high
Intelligence subjects tend to achieve concept attainment
solution through the use of hypothesis testing more than
average intelligence subjects. What these results do estab-
lish Is that the complexity of the stimuli did not differ-
entially affect the performance of the high and average
r
Intelligence subjects.
To evaluate further whether high Intelligence subjects
solve concept attainment problems through the use of hy-
pothesis testing. Osier had divided her subjects who solved
the task Into gradual and sudden learners based on their
performance over the ten trials preceding the ten criterion
trials. She found that the number of sudden learners In
the high Intelligence group was significantly greater than
In the average intelligence group. A similar test was
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attempted In the present study even though Osier did not
obtain significant dl fferences ' for the age level used In
this Investigation. We failed to achieve significance In
this evaluation of the number of sudden learners In the
two Intelligence groups.
It Is not clear at this point what the failure to
obtain differences between high and average Intelligence
subjects on the test of gradual vs. sudden learners Indi-
cates. One possibility Is that high Intelligence subjects
do not use hypothesis testing as a means of solving concept
attainment problems significantly more often than average
Intelligence subjects, and the question of different types
of learning as mediating the process of concept attainment
In different Intelligence levels Is still open to Investi-
gation. An alternative explanation Is that the method of
evaluation of hypothesis testing was not sufficiently pre-
cise to determine the extent and scope of the hypotheses
formulated by the two intelligence groups.
Still another possibility Is that the sudden vs.
gradual learners Is not a valid method for tapping hypoth-
esis testing as a means of concept attainment. It Is quite
possible that a high Intelligence subject (or even an
average Intelligence subject) may be testing an hypothesis
47
which Is correct 70, 80. or 90* of the time, end thus would
be classified as a gradual learner when he shifts and
solves the problem. This would be especially true under
the Set 1 (76* one Instance) condition where the hypothesis
of larger number would be correct 75* of the time over a
trial block of twelve trials, even though the subject had
made the shift to the correct hypothesis. Thus, one can
see that the sudden vs. gradual test may not necessarily
be a good test for this type of task and may, in fact, lead
to some spurious results.
One possible conclusion of the failure to find dif-
ferences In the number of gradual and sudden learners Is
that both high and average Intelligence subjects use hy-
pothesis testing. Apparently hypothesis testing behavior
Is not peculiar to subjects of high Intelligence who are
seven to eight years of age. Average Intelligence subjects
also employ hypothesis testing In order to solve conceptual
problems. If subjects of both high and average Intelligence
of this age level make use of hypothesis testing, what are
the underlying processes used by the high intelligence
subjects to solve the problem more efficiently? One pos-
sibility is the point raised by Riley (1968), He stated
that it Is possible for subjects to make use of hypothesis
testing, but only to consider one hypothesis at a time, and
to focus solely on the Information relevant to that one
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hypothesis. It Is possible then that subjects of average
Intelligence formulate a limited number of hypotheses, do
not shift as quickly with the non-reinforcement of a hypoth-
esis, and may stay with a hypothesis longer even though it
Is not reinforced 100% of the time, High intelligence sub-
jects, on the other hand, may assimilate Information rele-
vant to hypotheses other than the one they are currently
testing, and may be able to shift more quickly following
the non-reinforcement of an hypothesis. These speculations
will be discussed below.
Each subject, following completion of the task, was
asked how he knew how to get a marble every time. While
such reports are purely qualitative and based upon intro-
spective data, they are relevant to the differences between
the high and average Intelligence subjects formulated above.
Analysis of the data showed that those subjects who solved
the task were able to give the correct answer significantly
more than the subjects who failed to solve the task. In
addition, it was found that the high Intelligence subjects
were able to give the correct answer significantly more than
were the subjects of average Intelligence. Such results
suggest that the high Intelligence subjects were more able
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to put their hypotheses Into verbal terms than were the
average Intelligence subjects.
Also worthy of mention Is the qualitative aspect of
the answers to the question, as well as the observations of
the experimenter. Most of the subjects who solved the task
answered the question by stating, "By pressing the one (but-
ton) with the two," or a slight variation of that statement.
When questioned further In an attempt to get Information
about previous hypotheses before they arrived at the correct
principle, some of the subjects who solved the problem were
able to verbalize another hypothesis which they had been
testing. The most frequent of the other hypotheses was
the "larger number" hypothesis.
Of even greater Interest was the performance of the
subjects who failed to solve the problem. Almost Invariably
the hypothesis used by these subjects was an alternation
strategy or some slight variation of one. They would use
an alternation procedure until they got a marble. They
then would continue with such an hypothesis until they met
a non-rel nforced trial. Then their behavior became random
until they reached another reinforced trial, and following
the reinforced trial they continued with alternating re-
sponses and repeated the entire process through to the
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completion of the task.
These subjects when questioned following the task
replied either with an "I don't know," or would tell the
experimenter that you got a marble every time by going
back and forth between the two choices. When questioned
further as to whether or not they got a marble every time
using this procedure, the frequent answer was "No, but I
got one most of the time." Apparently, with some children
the partial confirmation of a hypothesis was strong enough
reinforcement for them to continue with an hypothesis which
was not correct 100% of the time,
A conclusion that seems to follow from the above quali-
tative analysis Is that average intelligence subjects have
a different standard of adequacy than do subjects of high
Intelligence. For average intelligence subjects 100% re-
inforcement of an hypothesis Is not necessary; high Intelli-
gence subjects, on the other hand, demand 100% reinforcement
of an hypothesis. What Is Implied here Is that some sort of
perceived adequacy of a response may be operating. Klein
(1960) noted that one must distinguish between the •xjgerl
enced confirmations of attainment from the fact of behav-
ioral change alone. That Is, Individuals have different
cognitive styles where adequacy or an acceptable fit
are
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different for each Individual. Klein goes on to note
further:
"... the expe rienced attainment may be crucial
In learning, 1 . e., in the "reinforcement" of
behavior, ... that adequate results of activity
are more likely to make sense to the learner
than will simply a motor response or a perception.
Now, If cognitive style contributes to such ex-
periences of confirmation. It may also be ex-
pected to affect the course of learning (1960,
p. 97)".
Several explanations of the behavior of the subjects
In this Investigation may now be proposed. Apparently,
the ability to take In Information and to transform such
Information Is critical to efficient concept attainment.
In addition, the subject must also take In Information not
relevant only to the hypothesis presently under considera-
tion, and thus be able to shift from an unsupported hypoth-
esis to another In order to solve the task.
Crucial In this process Is the amount of reinforcement
or non-reinforcement necessary for a given subject before
he will shift to another hypothesis,, What level of rein-
forcement does a given subject perceive as adequate support
for his hypothesis? Apparently, for the subjects of average
intelligence In this Investigation partial reinforcement of
a given hypothesis is acceptable and does not lead as
promptly to an hypothesis change. Also, these subjects are
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not able to assimilate Information relevant to alternative
hypotheses as quickly as the high Intelligence subjects and
therefore do not change their hypotheses as quickly. Sub-
jects of high Intelligence, on the other hand, are not able
to tolerate a lowered level of reinforcement and will shift
their hypotheses after a relatively minimal number of non-
relnforced trials, whereas the subjects of average Intelli-
gence will not. Perhaps high Intelligence subjects did not
perceive the task to be solved until they reached 100%
reinforcement, whereas the subjects of average Intelli-
gence more often perceived the task as solved with less
than 100% reinforcement.
From this discussion one can conclude that the process
of concept attainment is not solely based on either hypoth-
esis testing or the reinforcement contingencies operating
at the time, but rather a combination of these two processes.
These formulations of the processes involved in concept
attainment require further substantiation and probably de-
mand the refinement, of experimental techniques in future
research
.
The following is an explanation for the failure of
the verbalization group to perform In a significantly
superior manner to the control group. It seems as though
most of the subjects In this investigation were at a
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similar level of verbal sophistication for this task so as
not to create any significant differences. Other investi-
gators (Weir and Stevenson, 1959) obtained significant dif-
ferences for subjects of the same age as those used In this
study, but their task was a discrimination learning task
which was not as complex as the one used in this Investiga-
tion. Apparently, the subjects In this task who verbalized
their responses did so without using their verbalizations
as part of the task. With seven to eight year olds and
complex Information on a task such as the one used in this
Investigation, the effect of verbalization did not serve
to hold the verbalized response for further selective
evaluation. Rather, the subjects may have perceived the
verbalization as separate from the task and did not make
use of It In their solutions.
The lack of support for the hypothesis concerning the
Interaction between the dl sproportlonal 1 ty of different
negative Instances and Intelligence bears consideration.
The basis for this hypothesis came from Wolff’s (1967a)
explanation of his results. Wolff made use of Podell's
(1958) explanation which hypothesized that a high variety
of positive stimuli facilitates hypothesis testing learning
(l.e., high intelligence subjects), while It hinders simple
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associative learning (l.e.. average Intelligence subjects).
Wolff felt that Podell's conclusions were applicable to the
negative stimuli of the task he used, and thus felt that
the performance of the high Intelligence subjects was hin-
dered under the 75% one Instance condition which Osier had
used.
There are, however, several points of Podell's study
which must be considered. Podell based her conclusions
upon the variety of positive Instances, and her reasoning may
not extend to data dealing with negative Instances. In ad-
dition, Podell's task was more of a classification or sort-
ing task, and thus different from the tasks used In the
present as well as In Wolff's Investigation.
It Is possible, however, that Podell's explanation may
apply to negative as well as to positive Instances and may
also be valid for the type of concept attainment task used
In this investigation. If this Is the case, then the fail-
ure to support the hypothesis regarding dlsproportlonal Ity
of different negative Instances Interacting with Intelli-
gence adds support to the previous contention that hypoth-
esis testing behavior Is not a process peculiar only to
high Intelligence subjects of the age used in this Investi-
gation. If hypothesis testing Is more frequent among sub-
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Jects of the age used by both Osier and Wolff, then the
dl sproportlonal 1 ty of different negative Instances may
affect only the subjects of a higher age level than those
used In this Investigation.
There Is no question that the dl sproportlonal 1 ty of
different negative Instances (76% one Instance) made solu-
tion of the concept attainment task easier and more effi-
cient. Several explanations for this data can be put
forward. The first Is that with the presence of "one
Instance" on 75% of the trials, a subject can easily and
quickly eliminate one possibility of a response. That Is,
the "one Instance" can be quickly eliminated because It Is
not reinforced on 75% of the trials and would have even
greater effect over short blocks of trials. The subject
Is then free to work on eliminating the other negative In-
stances. In addition, as cited before, the 75% one Instance
condition could also possibly lead to the formation of an
alternate hypothesis such as "larger number." Such an hy-
pothesis would only be correct 75% of the time and could
be quickly tested andaltered to fit the Incoming data.
Under the equal proportion condition there Is no way In
which an hypothesis could be formed and tested as quickly
and therefore altered.
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Even though the 76% one Instance condition was easier
to solve, the average and high Intelligence subjects did
not perform at a similar level. Apparently under both
conditions regarding the frequency of different negative
Intances the high Intelligence subjects, because of their
ability to shift from hypotheses which had proven to be In-
correct, were still able to perform at a high level, higner
than that of the subjects of average Intelligence.
The results of this Investigation Indicate that with
the presence of a set of stimuli which had '‘one Instance"
as the negative Instance 75% of the time Osier used a
simpler stimulus set. Why the high Intelligence subjects
In her study did not perform at the same high level as In
this study under the object two set Is not apparent at this
time. However, It seems possible that since Osier’s studies
now appear to be the discrepant findings In this area of
research. It Is quite likely that there were other factors,
unclear at this time, which contributed to the results she
obtained. Furthermore, It is reasonable to view Osier
results In light of what Is now two unsuccessful
attempts
to replicate and to conclude that her results
may not be
val Id.
The general conclusions of this study may
be stated as
follows. Subjects of high Intelligence because of
their
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ability to shift hypotheses quickly following the non-
reinforcement of a response perform better on concept attain-
ment tasks than do subjects of average Intelligence. Ap-
parently. subjects of both high and average Intelligence of
seven to eight years of age make use of hypothesis testing
In order to solve concept attainment problems. Children of
high and average Intelligence both have verbal labels for
stimuli available, and this does not appear to be the criti-
cal variable in the superior performance of the high Intelli-
gence subjects. Complexity of stimulus materials does not
differentially affect the performance of high and average
Intelligence subjects. Finally, when M one Instance" Is
the negative Instance on 75 % of the trials, concept attain-
ment Is easier and more efficient.
Future research In this area should be primarily
directed at tests of trying to more firmly and validly
establish the process underlying concept attainment.
Attempts to partial out effects due to memory and cognitive
styles involving the scanning and articulating the various
aspects of the stimulus field would likely tap some of the
abilities of high Intelligence subjects which allows them
to function In a superior manner.
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More searching methods of questioning subjects during
a concept attainment task should be attempted, and would
lead to valuable information regarding the process of con-
cept attainment. Perhaps the method of having subjects
justify their choices as the task progresses might be a
useful method although Osier and Five! (1961) claimed that
It Influenced their subjects’ behavior.
t -.r
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Appendix 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Experimental Groups for
Age and Holllngshead Index of Social Position
*
Age (In Months
)
Hoi 1 1 ngshead Seal
M SD M SD
High 93.56 3.58 2.48 1.18
Average 94.75 2.96 2.71 1,17
Simple 93.76 3.21 2.87 1.17
Complex 93.91 3.11 2.62 1.06
Object Two 94.21 3.40 2.28 1.29
Verbal 1 zatlon 94.07 3.51 2.65 1.15
Control 93.87 3.38 2.54 1.21
Set 1 94.89 3.08 2.92 1.11
Set 2 93.64 2.93 2.73 1.15
Appendix 2
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Analysis of Variance Omitting the Data for the ComplexStimuli and Collapsed over Levels of Verbalization for
Number of Errors on the Concept Attainment Task
df ss. MS F
Intel 1 1g
.
(A) 1 4306.64 4306.64 11.26 .005
Complexity (B) 1 1774.52 1774.52 4.64 .05
Freq, of Neg. (C) 1 2537.64 2537.64 6.35 .025
AB 1 199.54 199.54 1 <- ns
AC 1 11.39 11.39 1 4 ns
BC 1 1.26 1.26 1 ns
ABC 1 404.99 404.99 1.06 ns
S/ABC 57 21800.13 382.46
Total 64 31036.11
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Appendix 3
Means and Standard Deviations Omitting the Data for Complex
Stimuli and Collapsed over Levels of Verbalization for
Number of Errors on the Concept Attainment Ta 3 k
M SD
High 20.47 18.79
Average 36.87 21.95
Simple 23.41 22.01
Object Two 33.94 20.72
Set 1 22.37 20.62
Set 2 34.97 21.57
High
Simple 13.44 15.85
Object Two 27.50 18.87
Averag e
Simple 33.37 22.78
Object Two 40.37 20.50
High
Set 1 13.75 21.12
Set 2 27.19 20.21
Average
Set 1 31.00 22.21
Set 2 42.75 20.03
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Appendix 4
Raw Scores, Age, Soclo-Economl
Experimental
c Classification for All
Subjects
Number Errors
(In
Age
Months)
Soclo-
Economic Otis
High, Simpie. Set 1, Verbal 1 ze 1
1
on
1 7 95 4 119
2 2 91 3 116
3 10 99 3 119
4 2 82 4 122
High, Simple, Set 1, Control
5 1 91 4 121
6 15 97 4 116
7 38 99 3 117
8 0 99 3 116
High, Sim pie. Set 2, Verbal Izatl on
9 27 92 2 124
10 7 91 3 117
11 7 100 5 118
12 13 95 4 121
High
,
Simple, Set 2, Control
13 3 93 1 119
14 22 91 2 115
15 60 93 1 119
16 1 92 2 121
High, Complex
,
Set 1
,
Verbalization
17 0 92 2 119
18 15 94 3 116
19 1 96 5 124
20 27 95 2 116
wise
120
121
117
118
120
119
121
121
122
116
123
117
116
117
119
122
117
121
120
121
Appendix 4 (cont'd)
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S Number Errors
(In
Age
Months
Soclo -
) Economi
c
Otis
21
22
23
24
High, Complex, Set 1, Control
34
24
28
6
96
91
93
92
1 120
4 125
2 115
3 115
High, Complex, Set 2, Verbalization
25
26
69
26
92
90
2
3
117
11627 19 97 3 11728 30 91 1 119
High, Complex
,
Set 2, Control
29 10 91 2 125
30 24 90 2 115
31 50 93 4 118
32 3 91 3 125
High, Object Two, Set 1. Verbal Izatl on
33 0 93 3 125
34 15 89 2 118
35 20 98 1 121
36 43 95 1 118
High, Object Two, Set It Control
37 31 94 1 121
38 2 91 5 118
39 1 93 2 117
40 33 98 2 121
wise
118
120
118
120
122
119
122
115
121
119
123
122
120
117
118
121
118
117
121
119
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Appendix 4 (cont'd)
S Numbe r Errors Age Socl
o
- IQ
(In Months) Economic Otis WISC
High, Object Two, Set 2, Verbalization
41 61 91 1 121 119
42 19 98 1 117 115
43 49 91 1 115 117
44 9 98 1 124 119
High
,
Object Two, Set 2, Control
45 34 100 3 116 115
46 23 97 1 117 117
47 47 90 2 117 118
48 53 91 2 125 121
Average
,
Simple, Set 1. Verbalization
49 48 94 5 96 98
50 6 97 3 96 99
51 1 94 3 100 104
52 39 95 2 105 101
Average, Simple, Set 1 , Control
53 34 92 3 103 100
54 4 94 2 103 99
55 27 95 2 105 102
56 42 91 4 103 100
Average
,
Simple, Set 2, Verbal Izatlon
57 67 95 4 100 96
58 35 98 3 100 •j 95
59 5 91 1 105 102
60 64 94 4 105 101
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Appendix 4 (cont‘d)
Number Errors Age Soclo-
(In Months) Economic i 11Otis wise
61
Average
0
, Simple, Set 2
97
, Control
4 103 10062 56 94 2 102 9863 55 97 1 104 9964 51 92 1 103 98
65
Average, Complex, Set 1,
1 93
Verbal Izatlon
3 99 95
66 18 95 2 103 99
67 51 97 4 97 101
68 21 91 3 100 100
69
Average
52
, Complex, Set
100
1, Control
2 95 98
70 47 95 1 105 102
71 4 97 4 103 98
72 55 93 4 101 99
73
Average, Complex, Set 2,
5 94
Verbalization
1 97 99
74 21 91 3 101 100
75 72 93 3 96 101
76 11 96 2 98 100
77
Average
54
,
Complex, Set
93
2, Control
3 96 98
78 42 103 4 100 101
79 29 99 1 100 102
80 45 97 2 104 100
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Appendix 4 (cont'd)
S Number Errors Age Soclo- IQ
(In Months
)
Economic Otis wise
Average, Object Two
,
Set 1, Verbalization
81 2 92 3 100 96
82 76 97 2 96 97
83 l 92 2 103 99
84 55 97 5 102 100
Average, Object Two, Set 1, Control
85 42 89 1 99 100
86 24 99 5 103 101
87 54 95 3 100 99
88 41 91 5 102 102
Average, Object Two
,
Set 2, Verbalization
89 36 96 2 105 104
90 43 94 2 105 100
91 42 89 3 100 100
92 50 100 2 101 102
Average, Object Two, Set 2, Control
93 11 93 3 103 101
94 53 98 1 97 98
95 59 97 2 98 95
96 57 92 3 100 96

